---
name: identityserver-key-management
description: Managing cryptographic signing keys in Duende IdentityServer, including automatic key management, KeyManagementOptions, data protection at rest, static key configuration, migration from static to automatic, and multi-instance deployment considerations.
invocable: false
---

# Key Management and Signing

## When to Use This Skill

- Configuring automatic key management for signing token keys
- Setting up static/manual signing keys from certificates or key vaults
- Configuring key rotation intervals and key lifecycle
- Migrating from static keys to automatic key management
- Deploying IdentityServer in load-balanced or multi-instance environments
- Protecting keys at rest using data protection
- Configuring per-algorithm or per-resource signing
- Troubleshooting key-related errors (CryptographicException, unprotecting key failures)

Docs: https://docs.duendesoftware.com/identityserver/fundamentals/key-management/

## Core Concepts

IdentityServer issues cryptographically signed tokens: identity tokens, JWT access tokens, and logout tokens. These signatures require key material that can be managed automatically or manually (statically).

### Supported Signing Algorithms

IdentityServer supports the `RS`, `PS`, and `ES` families:

| Family | Algorithms                | Key Type |
| ------ | ------------------------- | -------- |
| RS     | `RS256`, `RS384`, `RS512` | RSA      |
| PS     | `PS256`, `PS384`, `PS512` | RSA      |
| ES     | `ES256`, `ES384`, `ES512` | ECDSA    |

### Core Rotation Rule

Regardless of approach, safe rotation obeys one rule: **publish a new public key in discovery (JWKS) BEFORE using it to sign tokens, and keep a RETIRED public key published until every token signed with it has expired.** Automatic Key Management enforces this overlap for you (Announced → Signing → Retired phases). With static/manual keys you must perform the overlap yourself via phased rotation (see [Manual Key Rotation](#manual-key-rotation-phased-approach)).

## Automatic Key Management (Recommended)

Automatic Key Management handles key creation, rotation, announcement, and retirement. It is enabled by default and is part of the Business and Enterprise editions.

### Key Lifecycle

Keys move through four phases:

```
Announced --> Signing --> Retired --> Deleted
   |             |            |          |
   |<--Propagation-->|        |          |
   |             |<--Rotation-->|        |
   |             |            |<--Retention-->|
```

| Phase         | Duration (default)                           | Purpose                                       |
| ------------- | -------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------- |
| **Announced** | 14 days (`PropagationTime`)                  | Published in discovery, not yet signing       |
| **Signing**   | 76 days (RotationInterval - PropagationTime) | Active signing credential                     |
| **Retired**   | 14 days (`RetentionDuration`)                | In discovery for token validation only        |
| **Deleted**   | After retention                              | Removed from discovery and optionally deleted |

**Default schedule:** Keys rotate every 90 days, announced 14 days early, retained 14 days after rotation.

### Configuration

```csharp
// Program.cs
var idsvrBuilder = builder.Services.AddIdentityServer(options =>
{
    // Key rotates every 30 days
    options.KeyManagement.RotationInterval = TimeSpan.FromDays(30);

    // Announce new key 2 days in advance in discovery
    options.KeyManagement.PropagationTime = TimeSpan.FromDays(2);

    // Keep old key for 7 days in discovery for validation
    options.KeyManagement.RetentionDuration = TimeSpan.FromDays(7);

    // Don't delete keys after their retention period is over
    options.KeyManagement.DeleteRetiredKeys = false;
});
```

### KeyManagement Options Reference

| Property                             | Default   | Description                                               |
| ------------------------------------ | --------- | --------------------------------------------------------- |
| `Enabled`                            | `true`    | Enable automatic key management                           |
| `SigningAlgorithms`                  | `[RS256]` | Algorithms for which keys are managed                     |
| `RsaKeySize`                         | `2048`    | RSA key size in bits                                      |
| `RotationInterval`                   | 90 days   | Age at which keys stop signing                            |
| `PropagationTime`                    | 14 days   | Time for new keys to propagate to all servers and clients |
| `RetentionDuration`                  | 14 days   | Duration retired keys remain in discovery                 |
| `DeleteRetiredKeys`                  | `true`    | Delete keys after retention period                        |
| `KeyPath`                            | `{ContentRootPath}/keys` | File system path for default key store               |
| `DataProtectKeys`                    | `true`    | Encrypt keys at rest using data protection                |
| `KeyCacheDuration`                   | 24 hours  | Cache duration for keys from store                        |
| `InitializationDuration`             | 5 minutes | Synchronization window on first key creation              |
| `InitializationSynchronizationDelay` | 5 seconds | Delay between retries during initialization               |

### Multiple Signing Algorithms

Configure multiple algorithms to serve clients with different requirements. The first algorithm in the list is the default for signing tokens.

```csharp
options.KeyManagement.SigningAlgorithms = new[]
{
    // RS256 for older clients (with X.509 wrapping)
    new SigningAlgorithmOptions(SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSha256) { UseX509Certificate = true },

    // PS256
    new SigningAlgorithmOptions(SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSsaPssSha256),

    // ES256
    new SigningAlgorithmOptions(SecurityAlgorithms.EcdsaSha256)
};
```

Override the default on a per-client or per-resource basis:

```csharp
// Client level
var client = new Client
{
    AllowedIdentityTokenSigningAlgorithms = { SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSsaPssSha256 }
};

// API Resource level
var api = new ApiResource("invoice")
{
    AllowedAccessTokenSigningAlgorithms = { SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSsaPssSha256 }
};
```

## Key Storage

### Default: File System

The default `FileSystemKeyStore` writes keys to the `KeyPath` directory (defaults to `{ContentRootPath}/keys`). This directory must be:

- Excluded from source control
- Accessible (read/write) to all load-balanced instances if using file-based storage

```csharp
// Program.cs
var idsvrBuilder = builder.Services.AddIdentityServer(options =>
{
    options.KeyManagement.KeyPath = "/home/shared/keys";
});
```

### EntityFramework Store

Use the EF operational store for database-backed key storage:

```csharp
// Program.cs
builder.Services.AddIdentityServer()
    .AddOperationalStore(options =>
    {
        options.ConfigureDbContext = b =>
            b.UseSqlServer(connectionString);
    });
```

### Custom Store

Implement `ISigningKeyStore` for custom storage (e.g., Azure Key Vault, AWS KMS):

```csharp
// Program.cs
builder.Services.AddIdentityServer()
    .AddSigningKeyStore<YourCustomStore>();
```

The store interface methods:

- `LoadKeysAsync` - load all keys (cached for `KeyCacheDuration`)
- `StoreKeyAsync` - persist a new key
- `DeleteKeyAsync` - remove a retired key

## Encryption of Keys at Rest

By default, keys are protected at rest using ASP.NET Core Data Protection (`DataProtectKeys = true`). Keep this enabled unless your custom `ISigningKeyStore` already ensures encryption (e.g., Azure Key Vault).

```csharp
// ❌ WRONG: Disabling without alternative encryption
options.KeyManagement.DataProtectKeys = false;

// ✅ CORRECT: Only disable when using a vault that encrypts at rest
options.KeyManagement.DataProtectKeys = false; // OK if using Azure Key Vault via custom ISigningKeyStore
```

### Data Protection Configuration for Production

Data protection must be properly configured for key encryption to work across instances. See [ASP.NET Core Data Protection](https://docs.duendesoftware.com/general/data-protection/) for foundational concepts and troubleshooting.

```csharp
// Program.cs
builder.Services.AddDataProtection()
    .PersistKeysToDbContext<MyDbContext>()        // or PersistKeysToAzureBlobStorage, etc.
    .ProtectKeysWithCertificate(certificate)      // or ProtectKeysWithAzureKeyVault
    .SetApplicationName("My.IdentityServer");
```

### Common Data Protection Problems

| Symptom                                                              | Cause                                             | Fix                                      |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------- |
| `CryptographicException: The key {ID} was not found in the key ring` | Data protection keys not shared across instances  | Configure shared key persistence         |
| `Error unprotecting key with kid {ID}`                               | Keys protected by a different data protection key | Ensure consistent data protection config |
| Keys work locally but fail in deployment                             | Default file-based storage uses ephemeral storage | Use durable, shared storage              |
| Keys break after redeployment                                        | Application name changed or not set               | Set explicit `SetApplicationName()`      |

## Static Key Management

For scenarios where you want explicit control over signing keys or your license does not include automatic key management.

### Disabling Automatic Key Management

```csharp
// Program.cs
var idsvrBuilder = builder.Services.AddIdentityServer(options =>
{
    options.KeyManagement.Enabled = false;
});
```

### Adding Static Signing Keys

```csharp
// Program.cs
var idsvrBuilder = builder.Services.AddIdentityServer();
var key = LoadKeyFromVault(); // your code to load the key
idsvrBuilder.AddSigningCredential(key, SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSha256);
```

Multiple signing keys can be registered. The first one added is the default.

### Adding Validation Keys

Register public keys that should be accepted for token validation (used during key rotation):

```csharp
idsvrBuilder.AddValidationKey(oldKey, SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSha256);
```

### Creating Self-Signed Certificates

```csharp
var name = "MySelfSignedCertificate";

using var rsa = RSA.Create(keySizeInBits: 2048);

var request = new CertificateRequest(
    subjectName: $"CN={name}",
    rsa,
    HashAlgorithmName.SHA256,
    RSASignaturePadding.Pkcs1
);

var certificate = request.CreateSelfSigned(
    DateTimeOffset.Now,
    DateTimeOffset.Now.AddYears(1)
);

var pfxBytes = certificate.Export(X509ContentType.Pfx, password: "password");
File.WriteAllBytes($"{name}.pfx", pfxBytes);
```

### Loading Keys from Disk or Certificate Store

```csharp
// From PFX file
var bytes = File.ReadAllBytes("mycertificate.pfx");
var certificate = X509CertificateLoader.LoadPkcs12(bytes, "password");

// From certificate store
var store = new X509Store(StoreName.My, StoreLocation.CurrentUser);
store.Open(OpenFlags.ReadWrite);
var certificate = store.Certificates.First(c => c.Thumbprint == "<thumbprint>");
```

## Manual Key Rotation (Phased Approach)

When using static keys, rotation must be performed carefully to avoid validation failures.

### Why Phased Rotation is Necessary

1. **Client/API caching** - Clients and APIs cache keys (default: 24 hours). Using a new key immediately means cached clients cannot validate tokens signed with it.
2. **Existing tokens** - Tokens signed with the old key are still valid. Removing the old key immediately invalidates those tokens.

### Phase 1: Announce the New Key

Sign with the old key, publish the new key as a validation key:

```csharp
var idsvrBuilder = builder.Services.AddIdentityServer(options =>
{
    options.KeyManagement.Enabled = false;
});

var oldKey = LoadOldKeyFromVault();
var newKey = LoadNewKeyFromVault();
idsvrBuilder.AddSigningCredential(oldKey, SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSha256);
idsvrBuilder.AddValidationKey(newKey, SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSha256);
```

**Wait:** Until all clients/APIs have refreshed their caches (default 24 hours).

### Phase 2: Start Signing with the New Key

Swap signing and validation keys:

```csharp
var idsvrBuilder = builder.Services.AddIdentityServer(options =>
{
    options.KeyManagement.Enabled = false;
});

var oldKey = LoadOldKeyFromVault();
var newKey = LoadNewKeyFromVault();
idsvrBuilder.AddSigningCredential(newKey, SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSha256);
idsvrBuilder.AddValidationKey(oldKey, SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSha256);
```

**Wait:** Until all tokens signed with the old key have expired (default access token lifetime: 1 hour).

### Phase 3: Remove the Old Key

```csharp
var idsvrBuilder = builder.Services.AddIdentityServer(options =>
{
    options.KeyManagement.Enabled = false;
});

var newKey = LoadNewKeyFromVault();
idsvrBuilder.AddSigningCredential(newKey, SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSha256);
```

## Migrating from Static to Automatic Key Management

This is also a three-phase process where automatic keys gradually replace static keys.

### Phase 1: Enable Automatic Key Management, Keep Signing with Static Key

The static signing credential takes precedence over automatic keys. Automatic key management begins creating and announcing keys in discovery.

```csharp
var idsvrBuilder = builder.Services.AddIdentityServer(options =>
{
    options.KeyManagement.Enabled = true;
});

var oldKey = LoadOldKeyFromVault();
idsvrBuilder.AddSigningCredential(oldKey, SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSha256);
```

**Wait:** Until all APIs and clients have updated their caches with the new automatic keys.

### Phase 2: Switch to Automatic Signing, Keep Static for Validation

Remove the static signing credential; keep it as a validation key:

```csharp
var idsvrBuilder = builder.Services.AddIdentityServer(options =>
{
    options.KeyManagement.Enabled = true;
});

var oldKey = LoadOldKeyFromVault();
idsvrBuilder.AddValidationKey(oldKey, SecurityAlgorithms.RsaSha256);
```

**Wait:** Until all tokens signed with the old static key have expired.

### Phase 3: Remove Static Key Entirely

```csharp
var idsvrBuilder = builder.Services.AddIdentityServer(options =>
{
    options.KeyManagement.Enabled = true;
});
```

## Multi-Instance / Load-Balanced Deployment

### Requirements

| Concern                             | Solution                                            |
| ----------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
| Key storage shared across instances | Use EF operational store or shared file system      |
| Data protection keys shared         | Configure shared data protection key persistence    |
| Key cache synchronization           | `PropagationTime` handles cache refresh windows     |
| Initialization race condition       | `InitializationDuration` (5 min) allows server sync |

### File System Store in Load-Balanced Environments

All instances need read/write access to the `KeyPath`:

```csharp
options.KeyManagement.KeyPath = "/shared-volume/identity-keys";
```

### Recommended: Database-Backed Store

```csharp
builder.Services.AddIdentityServer()
    .AddOperationalStore(options =>
    {
        options.ConfigureDbContext = b => b.UseSqlServer(connectionString);
    });
```

## OIDC + SAML Shared Signing Keys

When the SAML component is enabled, IdentityServer uses the **same signing credentials** for OIDC tokens and SAML messages — one key store, one rotation schedule. Rotated public keys are published in parallel via the OIDC JWKS endpoint and the SAML IdP metadata during rollover.

### X.509 Requirement (SAML metadata needs certificates)

SAML metadata requires X.509 certificates, not raw keys:

- **Automatic Key Management** — creates RSA keys by default, and the SAML component **auto-wraps** managed RSA keys in self-signed X.509 certificates. You do **not** need to set `UseX509Certificate` just to enable SAML.
- **Static Key Management** — you **must** configure an X.509 signing certificate **with a private key**. A manually registered raw RSA key — including one from `AddDeveloperSigningCredential()` — **cannot** be auto-wrapped for SAML.

### Constraints

- The default SAML signing service supports **RSA only**. `UseX509Certificate` is **not** supported for EC (`ES`) keys.
- For a different certificate, independent rotation, or an external key system, implement a custom `ISamlSigningService`.

### Rotation Knobs (shared with OIDC)

| Knob                | Effect for SAML                                                                                                          |
| ------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `PropagationTime`   | How long a new managed key is published before it starts signing — set long enough for all SPs to refresh IdP metadata. |
| `RetentionDuration` | Keeps the previous certificate in metadata while SPs may still validate old messages (and old OIDC tokens remain valid). |

Service providers with **statically configured** IdP certificates must update those certs on every rotation.

## Common Pitfalls

1. **`keys` directory in source control** - Contains cryptographic secrets. Add the `keys` directory (under the app content root) to `.gitignore`. If accidentally committed, the keys may be data-protected with development-only data protection keys and fail in production.

2. **Data protection not configured for production** - Default data protection uses machine-specific keys. In containers or multi-instance deployments, keys protected by one instance cannot be read by another. Always configure shared, persistent data protection.

3. **Immediate key rotation** - Switching signing keys without a transition period causes validation failures. Use the phased approach or rely on automatic key management.

4. **Disabling `DataProtectKeys` without alternative** - Turning off key encryption without ensuring your store encrypts at rest exposes signing keys to anyone with storage access.

5. **X.509 certificate expiration confusion** - IdentityServer does not validate X.509 certificate expiration dates. Expired certificates still work for signing. The expiration date is a policy decision, not a technical enforcement.

6. **Not setting `PropagationTime` long enough** - If clients/APIs cache keys longer than your propagation time, new keys may not be in their caches when signing starts. Ensure `PropagationTime` exceeds your longest cache duration.

7. **Mixing up Data Protection keys and signing keys** - These are completely separate. Data Protection uses symmetric encryption for sensitive data at rest. Signing keys use asymmetric cryptography for token signatures. Both must be properly configured.