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Update to Codex Security

Snapshot Nov 18, 2026 · 06:12 UTC · version 0.1.33

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WHAT CHANGED

Instructions updated for attack-path-analysis

Skill instructions — Now says: Determine whether each supplied finding has a supported attacker path, what impact it has, and whether it is reportable. Before creating or retaining files,...

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Skill instructions

Before

Oct 7, 2026 · 06:02 UTC

Before choosing paths or saving retained output, read `../../references/artifact-storage.md` and follow its storage policy. ## Objective Turn validated or still-plausible findings into explicit attacker stories, structured attack-path an...

After

Nov 18, 2026 · 06:12 UTC

Determine whether each supplied finding has a supported attacker path, what impact it has, and whether it is reportable. Before creating or retaining files, read `../../references/artifact-storage.md`. ## Establish the attack path For a ...

Supporting files

Before

Oct 7, 2026 · 06:02 UTC

[{"relative_path":"agents/openai.yaml","size_in_bytes":261},{"relative_path":"references/attack-path-facts.md","size_in_bytes":2882},{"relative_path":"references/severity-policy.md","size_in_bytes":15288}]

After

Nov 18, 2026 · 06:12 UTC

[{"relative_path":"agents/openai.yaml","size_in_bytes":261},{"relative_path":"references/attack-path-facts.md","size_in_bytes":1585},{"relative_path":"references/severity-policy.md","size_in_bytes":2644}]

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SKILL.md text changes

− removed · + added

--- before
+++ after
@@ -5,113 +5,50 @@
 
 # Security Attack Path Analysis
 
-Before choosing paths or saving retained output, read `../../references/artifact-storage.md` and follow its storage policy.
+Determine whether each supplied finding has a supported attacker path, what impact it has, and whether it is reportable. Before creating or retaining files, read `../../references/artifact-storage.md`.
 
-## Objective
+## Establish the attack path
 
-Turn validated or still-plausible findings into explicit attacker stories, structured attack-path analysis facts, severity calibration, and a final reportability decision grounded in the threat model.
+For a scan phase, use its per-scan threat model and candidate set from `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`. Preserve supplied input paths. If a required scan artifact is unavailable, report the missing input.
 
-## Artifact Resolution
+For standalone analysis, use the supplied finding, repository, threat model or security policy, and context. A per-scan artifact is not required. State material assumptions and ask for missing context only when it prevents a meaningful assessment.
 
-The path references in this skill are the default locations for this phase.
-If the user explicitly provides a different path for a required input or output, use the user-provided path instead of the corresponding default path referenced in this skill.
-If a required input is still missing, stop and ask the user for it before continuing.
-Use the shared scan artifact path conventions in `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`.
+1. Establish the in-scope attacker, affected product surface, entry point, controlled input, security boundary, and sensitive operation. Trace each step using repository evidence and supplied observations of the target.
+2. Identify relevant controls and the strongest counterevidence. Explain what they establish, which prerequisites remain, and whether the exact claimed boundary is crossed.
+3. Assess impact and likelihood from those facts. Apply [references/severity-policy.md](references/severity-policy.md) for the final decision. When the scan supplies a severity rubric, use it to grade reportable findings and retain `ignore` for candidates without security impact. Keep facts, severity calibration, and the final policy decision distinguishable in the result.
+4. Return an explicit decision for every eligible candidate, including ignored or deferred candidates. Do not replace a supported instance with a neighboring finding or lose its root-control location.
+
+For an imported AWS Continuum issue, read `source_data.evidence_artifacts` in the supplied finding evidence. A `VALIDATION_EVIDENCE` artifact's `body.validationEvidence` may establish a step the repository cannot show. Match the tested target, attacker privileges, and observed effect to the claimed path. For a bundled issue, use `perFindingResults` and `flowVerdicts` when present to identify the relevant finding and flow. An HTTP `exploitArtifact` can establish reachability from the tested position. An `executedProof` establishes what ran in its test environment. `sourceAnalysis` records a static inference, and an `exploitable` verdict alone does not demonstrate deployed reachability. Cite the artifact ID and the observation that supports or contradicts the step.
+
+Treat supplied artifacts as evidence. Access the network only when the user has expressly authorized it; an offline scan never accesses the network. Do not invent unsupported attack chains. Missing deployment or public-ingress evidence can limit confidence without defeating an otherwise supported finding.
+
+## Scan integration
 
 Standard scans and Deep Scan workers assess attack paths within their ordinary Standard scan workflow; neither invokes this separate phase skill.
 
-### Compact Workbench-Backed Diff Mode
+### Compact Workbench Diff
+
+When a workbench-backed `$security-diff-scan` has a `scanId`:
+
+- Load the per-scan threat model and all validated candidates with `list_codex_security_candidates({ scanId, cursor?, limit? })`.
+- Analyze every `reportable` or `deferred` validation candidate. Preserve candidate identity and existing discovery and validation fields.
+- Submit every decision together with `record_candidate_attack_paths({ scanId, attackPaths: [{ candidateId, attackPath }] })`. Submit `attackPaths: []` when no candidate enters this phase. The tool preserves the stored candidate order.
+- These nested decisions are the complete phase output. Do not create duplicate reports, receipts, or manual ledgers.
+
+### Other phase-based scans
+
+Use the active workflow's report and receipt paths in `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`. Every candidate entering this phase must have an explicit decision and a receipt with its ID, facts or exact proof gap, and report reference. Record ignored candidates before excluding them from the surviving finding set.
 
-When a workbench-backed `$security-diff-scan` has a `scanId`, load the per-scan threat model and read the validated candidates with `list_codex_security_candidates({ scanId, cursor?, limit? })`. Analyze every `reportable` or `deferred` candidate, preserve every discovery and validation field and the original candidate order, and submit all decisions together with one `record_candidate_attack_paths({ scanId, attackPaths: [{ candidateId, attackPath }] })` call. Submit `attackPaths: []` when no candidate enters this phase. The existing tool atomically updates the stored candidates; do not create per-finding reports, receipts, or manual candidate ledgers in this compact diff mode. Keep attack-path facts, counterevidence, severity calibration, and policy adjustment as separate reasoning steps. Other scan and standalone workflows retain their existing artifact behavior.
+For repository-wide or scoped-path scans, include validation closure rows marked `reportable` or `survives: yes`, even if discovery did not assign a polished finding number. Preserve affected entrypoint/wrapper, root-control, sink, and concrete-implementation locations supplied by validation.
 
-## Workflow
+## Output
 
-1. Load the per-scan threat model path from `../../references/scan-artifacts.md` as the repo-specific threat-model source of truth. Start from this along with the potential findings. Both inputs are required for this workflow.
-   - For repository-wide and scoped-path scans, include validation closure rows marked `reportable` or `survives: yes` even if they were not assigned polished candidate numbers during discovery.
-2. Determine whether the affected code is in scope for the repository threat model and whether it belongs to a product surface or production workflow.
-3. Build a factual attack path using repository evidence only:
-   - service mapping
-   - exposure and entry points
-   - identity, privilege, and trust boundaries
-   - secrets handling and sensitive-data flow
-   - reachability
-   - existing controls and mitigations
-4. Before finalizing scope or reportability-driving facts, identify the strongest repository counterevidence against the key scoping fields and explain why it is or is not dispositive.
-5. Calibrate impact and likelihood from the repository evidence.
-6. Apply a separate final policy-adjustment pass mechanically using those facts and the calibrated severity.
-7. Record final policy decision `ignore` explicitly; in compact diff mode, retain its candidate record for coverage, and otherwise drop it from the surviving finding set.
-8. For a durable diff scan, submit the nested decision for every eligible candidate in the single compact tool call. Otherwise, save that finding's visible attack-path report and append one attack-path receipt per candidate id at the default paths from `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`. The receipt must record the candidate id, attack-path reportability decision, attack-path facts or exact proof gap, and attack-path artifact/report reference for that candidate finding.
-
-## Scope and Attack Path Checklist
-
-Use this checklist before finalizing the attack-path facts or policy decision:
-
-- Determine whether the finding is actually a real security vulnerability rather than a correctness bug or false positive.
-- Determine whether the affected code belongs to a product surface or production workflow.
-- Map the relevant service, component, or workflow context from repository evidence.
-- Establish exposure and entry points from repository evidence such as listeners, ingress, load balancers, service ports, manifests, routing, or network policy.
-- Establish identities, privileges, and trust boundaries that matter for the path.
-- Establish whether sensitive data, secrets references, or privileged control paths are involved.
-- Determine whether a realistic attacker can actually reach and use the issue from an in-scope attack surface.
-- Identify the strongest repository counterevidence against the scoping and reportability-driving fields before finalizing them.
-- Lower confidence or keep fields unknown when repository evidence is incomplete; do not automatically suppress a finding solely because deployment evidence is missing.
-
-## Counterevidence Checklist
-
-For the most interpretive fields, explicitly ask what repository evidence suggests the opposite and why it does or does not defeat the finding:
-
-- In-Scope Status According to the Threat Model
-- Vector
-- Auth Scope
-- Exposure
-- Cross-Boundary Behavior
-- Preconditions
-- Impact Surface
-
-Look specifically for repository evidence that the path is:
-
-- out of scope
-- internal-only
-- admin-only
-- not cross-boundary
-- not attacker-reachable
-- not meaningfully reportable
-
-## Severity and Policy Checklist
-
-Apply severity and policy calibration using `references/severity-policy.md`.
-
-## Output Contract
-
-In compact diff mode, every candidate with validation disposition `reportable` or `deferred` must receive exactly one nested attack-path decision. The recorded decisions are the complete phase output; do not also create narrative reports or receipts. Otherwise, use the following report contract.
-
-For each surviving finding include:
-
-- title
-- candidate id, instance key, and ledger row id when provided
-- affected lines from validation, preserving labeled entrypoint/wrapper, root_control, sink, and concrete_implementation locations
-- attack path steps
-- rendered attack-path facts
-- counterevidence summary and challenges
-- severity calibration
-- final policy decision
-- enough reasoning that a later reader can understand why the finding survived or was suppressed
-
-Render attack-path facts using `references/attack-path-facts.md`.
-
-## Hard Rules
-
-- Use repository evidence and explicitly supplied context. Access the network only when the user has expressly authorized that access; an offline scan never accesses the network.
-- Do not invent attack chains that the code does not support.
-- Do not leave candidate coverage implicit. In compact diff mode, record a nested attack-path decision for every eligible candidate, even when the final policy decision is `ignore` or `deferred`. Otherwise, every candidate that reaches attack-path analysis must leave an attack-path receipt in its candidate-ledger path from `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`.
-- Do not drop exact affected locations while converting validated findings into attack paths. Repository-wide seeded/root-control rows that survive validation must keep their root-control file:line even when a wrapper, route, or transport is easier to explain.
-- Do not skip a reportable validation row because a neighboring same-family finding has a cleaner story. Either produce attack-path facts for that exact row or make an explicit final policy decision with repository counterevidence.
-- Missing public-ingress evidence is not by itself dispositive counterevidence.
-- Keep attack-path analysis, severity calibration, and final policy suppression as separate sub-stages.
-- Use the final policy-adjustment matrix mechanically rather than re-arguing severity from scratch after the facts are set.
-- Outside compact diff mode, save a final visible report for each candidate finding using that finding's attack-path analysis report path from `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`.
+For standalone analysis, follow the caller's format or return a concise assessment per finding. Scan phases use their output contract above. Include:
 
--- Considerations for attack path --
+- title and supplied candidate, instance, and ledger identities;
+- precise affected locations and attacker-to-impact steps;
+- relevant facts from [references/attack-path-facts.md](references/attack-path-facts.md);
+- controls, counterevidence, prerequisites, and material proof gaps;
+- impact, likelihood, calibrated severity, and final policy decision with their reasons.
 
-- A bug matters if evidence shows an attacker could exploit it.
-- The attack surface should generally be one that is plausibly exposed to end users / external actors (or another actor explicitly in scope in the threat model).
+Retain enough evidence to explain both surviving and suppressed findings. Apply the severity policy to the established facts rather than reopening discovery or substituting a different attack story.
Full technical diff · 2 changed fields

changed /included_files

BEFORE
[
  {
    "relative_path": "agents/openai.yaml",
    "size_in_bytes": 261
  },
  {
    "relative_path": "references/attack-path-facts.md",
    "size_in_bytes": 2882
  },
  {
    "relative_path": "references/severity-policy.md",
    "size_in_bytes": 15288
  }
]
AFTER
[
  {
    "relative_path": "agents/openai.yaml",
    "size_in_bytes": 261
  },
  {
    "relative_path": "references/attack-path-facts.md",
    "size_in_bytes": 1585
  },
  {
    "relative_path": "references/severity-policy.md",
    "size_in_bytes": 2644
  }
]

changed /skill_md_contents

BEFORE
"---\nname: attack-path-analysis\ndescription: Use when Codex is already in the attack-path-analysis phase of a security scan or the user explicitly asks to trace a security finding from source to sink and calibrate severity. Do not use as the primary trigger for full PR, commit, branch, patch, or repository scans.\n---\n\n# Security Attack Path Analysis\n\nBefore choosing paths or saving retained output, read `../../references/artifact-storage.md` and follow its storage policy.\n\n## Objective\n\nTurn validated or still-plausible findings into explicit attacker stories, structured attack-path analysis facts, severity calibration, and a final reportability decision grounded in the threat model.\n\n## Artifact Resolution\n\nThe path references in this skill are the default locations for this phase.\nIf the user explicitly provides a different path for a required input or output, use the user-provided path instead of the corresponding default path referenced in this skill.\nIf a required input is still missing, stop and ask the user for it before continuing.\nUse the shared scan artifact path conventions in `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`.\n\nStandard scans and Deep Scan workers assess attack paths within their ordinary Standard scan workflow; neither invokes this separate phase skill.\n\n### Compact Workbench-Backed Diff Mode\n\nWhen a workbench-backed `$security-diff-scan` has a `scanId`, load the per-scan threat model and read the validated candidates with `list_codex_security_candidates({ scanId, cursor?, limit? })`. Analyze every `reportable` or `deferred` candidate, preserve every discovery and validation field and the original candidate order, and submit all decisions together with one `record_candidate_attack_paths({ scanId, attackPaths: [{ candidateId, attackPath }] })` call. Submit `attackPaths: []` when no candidate enters this phase. The existing tool atomically updates the stored candidates; do not create per-finding reports, receipts, or manual candidate ledgers in this compact diff mode. Keep attack-path facts, counterevidence, severity calibration, and policy adjustment as separate reasoning steps. Other scan and standalone workflows retain their existing artifact behavior.\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. Load the per-scan threat model path from `../../references/scan-artifacts.md` as the repo-specific threat-model source of truth. Start from this along with the potential findings. Both inputs are required for this workflow.\n   - For repository-wide and scoped-path scans, include validation closure rows marked `reportable` or `survives: yes` even if they were not assigned polished candidate numbers during discovery.\n2. Determine whether the affected code is in scope for the repository threat model and whether it belongs to a product surface or production workflow.\n3. Build a factual attack path using repository evidence only:\n   - service mapping\n   - exposure and entry points\n   - identity, privilege, and trust boundaries\n   - secrets handling and sensitive-data flow\n   - reachability\n   - existing controls and mitigations\n4. Before finalizing scope or reportability-driving facts, identify the strongest repository counterevidence against the key scoping fields and explain why it is or is not dispositive.\n5. Calibrate impact and likelihood from the repository evidence.\n6. Apply a separate final policy-adjustment pass mechanically using those facts and the calibrated severity.\n7. Record final policy decision `ignore` explicitly; in compact diff mode, retain its candidate record for coverage, and otherwise drop it from the surviving finding set.\n8. For a durable diff scan, submit the nested decision for every eligible candidate in the single compact tool call. Otherwise, save that finding's visible attack-path report and append one attack-path receipt per candidate id at the default paths from `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`. The receipt must record the candidate id, attack-path reportability decision, attack-path facts or exact proof gap, and attack-path artifact/report reference for that candidate finding.\n\n## Scope and Attack Path Checklist\n\nUse this checklist before finalizing the attack-path facts or policy decision:\n\n- Determine whether the finding is actually a real security vulnerability rather than a correctness bug or false positive.\n- Determine whether the affected code belongs to a product surface or production workflow.\n- Map the relevant service, component, or workflow context from repository evidence.\n- Establish exposure and entry points from repository evidence such as listeners, ingress, load balancers, service ports, manifests, routing, or network policy.\n- Establish identities, privileges, and trust boundaries that matter for the path.\n- Establish whether sensitive data, secrets references, or privileged control paths are involved.\n- Determine whether a realistic attacker can actually reach and use the issue from an in-scope attack surface.\n- Identify the strongest repository counterevidence against the scoping and reportability-driving fields before finalizing them.\n- Lower confidence or keep fields unknown when repository evidence is incomplete; do not automatically suppress a finding solely because deployment evidence is missing.\n\n## Counterevidence Checklist\n\nFor the most interpretive fields, explicitly ask what repository evidence suggests the opposite and why it does or does not defeat the finding:\n\n- In-Scope Status According to the Threat Model\n- Vector\n- Auth Scope\n- Exposure\n- Cross-Boundary Behavior\n- Preconditions\n- Impact Surface\n\nLook specifically for repository evidence that the path is:\n\n- out of scope\n- internal-only\n- admin-only\n- not cross-boundary\n- not attacker-reachable\n- not meaningfully reportable\n\n## Severity and Policy Checklist\n\nApply severity and policy calibration using `references/severity-policy.md`.\n\n## Output Contract\n\nIn compact diff mode, every candidate with validation disposition `reportable` or `deferred` must receive exactly one nested attack-path decision. The recorded decisions are the complete phase output; do not also create narrative reports or receipts. Otherwise, use the following report contract.\n\nFor each surviving finding include:\n\n- title\n- candidate id, instance key, and ledger row id when provided\n- affected lines from validation, preserving labeled entrypoint/wrapper, root_control, sink, and concrete_implementation locations\n- attack path steps\n- rendered attack-path facts\n- counterevidence summary and challenges\n- severity calibration\n- final policy decision\n- enough reasoning that a later reader can understand why the finding survived or was suppressed\n\nRender attack-path facts using `references/attack-path-facts.md`.\n\n## Hard Rules\n\n- Use repository evidence and explicitly supplied context. Access the network only when the user has expressly authorized that access; an offline scan never accesses the network.\n- Do not invent attack chains that the code does not support.\n- Do not leave candidate coverage implicit. In compact diff mode, record a nested attack-path decision for every eligible candidate, even when the final policy decision is `ignore` or `deferred`. Otherwise, every candidate that reaches attack-path analysis must leave an attack-path receipt in its candidate-ledger path from `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`.\n- Do not drop exact affected locations while converting validated findings into attack paths. Repository-wide seeded/root-control rows that survive validation must keep their root-control file:line even when a wrapper, route, or transport is easier to explain.\n- Do not skip a reportable validation row because a neighboring same-family finding has a cleaner story. Either produce attack-path facts for that exact row or make an explicit final policy decision with repository counterevidence.\n- Missing public-ingress evidence is not by itself dispositive counterevidence.\n- Keep attack-path analysis, severity calibration, and final policy suppression as separate sub-stages.\n- Use the final policy-adjustment matrix mechanically rather than re-arguing severity from scratch after the facts are set.\n- Outside compact diff mode, save a final visible report for each candidate finding using that finding's attack-path analysis report path from `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`.\n\n-- Considerations for attack path --\n\n- A bug matters if evidence shows an attacker could exploit it.\n- The attack surface should generally be one that is plausibly exposed to end users / external actors (or another actor explicitly in scope in the threat model).\n"
AFTER
"---\nname: attack-path-analysis\ndescription: Use when Codex is already in the attack-path-analysis phase of a security scan or the user explicitly asks to trace a security finding from source to sink and calibrate severity. Do not use as the primary trigger for full PR, commit, branch, patch, or repository scans.\n---\n\n# Security Attack Path Analysis\n\nDetermine whether each supplied finding has a supported attacker path, what impact it has, and whether it is reportable. Before creating or retaining files, read `../../references/artifact-storage.md`.\n\n## Establish the attack path\n\nFor a scan phase, use its per-scan threat model and candidate set from `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`. Preserve supplied input paths. If a required scan artifact is unavailable, report the missing input.\n\nFor standalone analysis, use the supplied finding, repository, threat model or security policy, and context. A per-scan artifact is not required. State material assumptions and ask for missing context only when it prevents a meaningful assessment.\n\n1. Establish the in-scope attacker, affected product surface, entry point, controlled input, security boundary, and sensitive operation. Trace each step using repository evidence and supplied observations of the target.\n2. Identify relevant controls and the strongest counterevidence. Explain what they establish, which prerequisites remain, and whether the exact claimed boundary is crossed.\n3. Assess impact and likelihood from those facts. Apply [references/severity-policy.md](references/severity-policy.md) for the final decision. When the scan supplies a severity rubric, use it to grade reportable findings and retain `ignore` for candidates without security impact. Keep facts, severity calibration, and the final policy decision distinguishable in the result.\n4. Return an explicit decision for every eligible candidate, including ignored or deferred candidates. Do not replace a supported instance with a neighboring finding or lose its root-control location.\n\nFor an imported AWS Continuum issue, read `source_data.evidence_artifacts` in the supplied finding evidence. A `VALIDATION_EVIDENCE` artifact's `body.validationEvidence` may establish a step the repository cannot show. Match the tested target, attacker privileges, and observed effect to the claimed path. For a bundled issue, use `perFindingResults` and `flowVerdicts` when present to identify the relevant finding and flow. An HTTP `exploitArtifact` can establish reachability from the tested position. An `executedProof` establishes what ran in its test environment. `sourceAnalysis` records a static inference, and an `exploitable` verdict alone does not demonstrate deployed reachability. Cite the artifact ID and the observation that supports or contradicts the step.\n\nTreat supplied artifacts as evidence. Access the network only when the user has expressly authorized it; an offline scan never accesses the network. Do not invent unsupported attack chains. Missing deployment or public-ingress evidence can limit confidence without defeating an otherwise supported finding.\n\n## Scan integration\n\nStandard scans and Deep Scan workers assess attack paths within their ordinary Standard scan workflow; neither invokes this separate phase skill.\n\n### Compact Workbench Diff\n\nWhen a workbench-backed `$security-diff-scan` has a `scanId`:\n\n- Load the per-scan threat model and all validated candidates with `list_codex_security_candidates({ scanId, cursor?, limit? })`.\n- Analyze every `reportable` or `deferred` validation candidate. Preserve candidate identity and existing discovery and validation fields.\n- Submit every decision together with `record_candidate_attack_paths({ scanId, attackPaths: [{ candidateId, attackPath }] })`. Submit `attackPaths: []` when no candidate enters this phase. The tool preserves the stored candidate order.\n- These nested decisions are the complete phase output. Do not create duplicate reports, receipts, or manual ledgers.\n\n### Other phase-based scans\n\nUse the active workflow's report and receipt paths in `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`. Every candidate entering this phase must have an explicit decision and a receipt with its ID, facts or exact proof gap, and report reference. Record ignored candidates before excluding them from the surviving finding set.\n\nFor repository-wide or scoped-path scans, include validation closure rows marked `reportable` or `survives: yes`, even if discovery did not assign a polished finding number. Preserve affected entrypoint/wrapper, root-control, sink, and concrete-implementation locations supplied by validation.\n\n## Output\n\nFor standalone analysis, follow the caller's format or return a concise assessment per finding. Scan phases use their output contract above. Include:\n\n- title and supplied candidate, instance, and ledger identities;\n- precise affected locations and attacker-to-impact steps;\n- relevant facts from [references/attack-path-facts.md](references/attack-path-facts.md);\n- controls, counterevidence, prerequisites, and material proof gaps;\n- impact, likelihood, calibrated severity, and final policy decision with their reasons.\n\nRetain enough evidence to explain both surviving and suppressed findings. Apply the severity policy to the established facts rather than reopening discovery or substituting a different attack story.\n"
Full snapshot data
{
  "description": "Use when Codex is already in the attack-path-analysis phase of a security scan or the user explicitly asks to trace a security finding from source to sink and calibrate severity. Do not use as the primary trigger for full PR, commit, branch, patch, or repository scans.",
  "included_files": [
    {
      "relative_path": "agents/openai.yaml",
      "size_in_bytes": 261
    },
    {
      "relative_path": "references/attack-path-facts.md",
      "size_in_bytes": 1585
    },
    {
      "relative_path": "references/severity-policy.md",
      "size_in_bytes": 2644
    }
  ],
  "name": "attack-path-analysis",
  "skill_md_contents": "---\nname: attack-path-analysis\ndescription: Use when Codex is already in the attack-path-analysis phase of a security scan or the user explicitly asks to trace a security finding from source to sink and calibrate severity. Do not use as the primary trigger for full PR, commit, branch, patch, or repository scans.\n---\n\n# Security Attack Path Analysis\n\nDetermine whether each supplied finding has a supported attacker path, what impact it has, and whether it is reportable. Before creating or retaining files, read `../../references/artifact-storage.md`.\n\n## Establish the attack path\n\nFor a scan phase, use its per-scan threat model and candidate set from `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`. Preserve supplied input paths. If a required scan artifact is unavailable, report the missing input.\n\nFor standalone analysis, use the supplied finding, repository, threat model or security policy, and context. A per-scan artifact is not required. State material assumptions and ask for missing context only when it prevents a meaningful assessment.\n\n1. Establish the in-scope attacker, affected product surface, entry point, controlled input, security boundary, and sensitive operation. Trace each step using repository evidence and supplied observations of the target.\n2. Identify relevant controls and the strongest counterevidence. Explain what they establish, which prerequisites remain, and whether the exact claimed boundary is crossed.\n3. Assess impact and likelihood from those facts. Apply [references/severity-policy.md](references/severity-policy.md) for the final decision. When the scan supplies a severity rubric, use it to grade reportable findings and retain `ignore` for candidates without security impact. Keep facts, severity calibration, and the final policy decision distinguishable in the result.\n4. Return an explicit decision for every eligible candidate, including ignored or deferred candidates. Do not replace a supported instance with a neighboring finding or lose its root-control location.\n\nFor an imported AWS Continuum issue, read `source_data.evidence_artifacts` in the supplied finding evidence. A `VALIDATION_EVIDENCE` artifact's `body.validationEvidence` may establish a step the repository cannot show. Match the tested target, attacker privileges, and observed effect to the claimed path. For a bundled issue, use `perFindingResults` and `flowVerdicts` when present to identify the relevant finding and flow. An HTTP `exploitArtifact` can establish reachability from the tested position. An `executedProof` establishes what ran in its test environment. `sourceAnalysis` records a static inference, and an `exploitable` verdict alone does not demonstrate deployed reachability. Cite the artifact ID and the observation that supports or contradicts the step.\n\nTreat supplied artifacts as evidence. Access the network only when the user has expressly authorized it; an offline scan never accesses the network. Do not invent unsupported attack chains. Missing deployment or public-ingress evidence can limit confidence without defeating an otherwise supported finding.\n\n## Scan integration\n\nStandard scans and Deep Scan workers assess attack paths within their ordinary Standard scan workflow; neither invokes this separate phase skill.\n\n### Compact Workbench Diff\n\nWhen a workbench-backed `$security-diff-scan` has a `scanId`:\n\n- Load the per-scan threat model and all validated candidates with `list_codex_security_candidates({ scanId, cursor?, limit? })`.\n- Analyze every `reportable` or `deferred` validation candidate. Preserve candidate identity and existing discovery and validation fields.\n- Submit every decision together with `record_candidate_attack_paths({ scanId, attackPaths: [{ candidateId, attackPath }] })`. Submit `attackPaths: []` when no candidate enters this phase. The tool preserves the stored candidate order.\n- These nested decisions are the complete phase output. Do not create duplicate reports, receipts, or manual ledgers.\n\n### Other phase-based scans\n\nUse the active workflow's report and receipt paths in `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`. Every candidate entering this phase must have an explicit decision and a receipt with its ID, facts or exact proof gap, and report reference. Record ignored candidates before excluding them from the surviving finding set.\n\nFor repository-wide or scoped-path scans, include validation closure rows marked `reportable` or `survives: yes`, even if discovery did not assign a polished finding number. Preserve affected entrypoint/wrapper, root-control, sink, and concrete-implementation locations supplied by validation.\n\n## Output\n\nFor standalone analysis, follow the caller's format or return a concise assessment per finding. Scan phases use their output contract above. Include:\n\n- title and supplied candidate, instance, and ledger identities;\n- precise affected locations and attacker-to-impact steps;\n- relevant facts from [references/attack-path-facts.md](references/attack-path-facts.md);\n- controls, counterevidence, prerequisites, and material proof gaps;\n- impact, likelihood, calibrated severity, and final policy decision with their reasons.\n\nRetain enough evidence to explain both surviving and suppressed findings. Apply the severity policy to the established facts rather than reopening discovery or substituting a different attack story.\n"
}

SHA-256 of public snapshot: 67043466b5f41e8c4b7ad979d3052995a48cf2215a4acbf534b547335bf048ad