← Cognitive DatabaseCONTENT HISTORY
WHAT CHANGED
Update to Cognitive Database
Snapshot Nov 18, 2026 · 06:17 UTC · version 0.1.7
Collection source: downloaded plugin package.
First saved snapshot
No earlier snapshot is available to establish a change.
Save Cognitive Database and check future changes in Following.
Up to 3 plugins free · no card required.
Compare saved observations
Download comparison JSONFull technical diff · 0 changed fields
Full snapshot data
{
"description": "Inspect the current user's profile, CognitiveDB access, and Space roles; administer Space membership, invitations, roles, Catalog/Schema/Table grants, ownership, and access audit evidence. Use for access questions, inspections, and confirmed access mutations.",
"included_files": [
{
"relative_path": "agents/openai.yaml",
"size_in_bytes": 233
}
],
"name": "cognitivedb-administer-access",
"skill_md_contents": "---\nname: cognitivedb-administer-access\ndescription: >-\n Inspect the current user's profile, CognitiveDB access, and Space roles;\n administer Space membership, invitations, roles, Catalog/Schema/Table grants,\n ownership, and access audit evidence. Use for access questions, inspections,\n and confirmed access mutations.\nmetadata:\n version: \"dev-1.8.1\"\n---\n\n# Administer CognitiveDB Access\n\nNever invent roles, users, grants, IDs, fields, scopes, actor identity, or authorization.\nUse the narrowest MCP read that answers the question. Treat structured MCP\nresults as authoritative and do not reproduce permission resolution in prose.\n\n## Boundaries\n\n- Keep Organization roles, Space roles, and data-asset grants separate; Space\n roles never imply Catalog ownership or grant authority. Report Organization\n membership or role mutation as unsupported when no dedicated live Tool exists.\n- Recognize Organization roles returned by live results; Space built-ins\n `Owner`, `Admin`, `User Admin`, `Role Admin`, and `Member`; and exact returned\n custom roles. Built-in `Owner` is not assignable.\n- Route Catalog/Schema lifecycle elsewhere. Never emulate access administration with SQL, resource tools, browser, HTTP, forged headers, or shared identity.\n- For a \"can I\" question, inspect only the authenticated current user's access.\n Do not inspect another user's effective permissions as part of that answer.\n A mutation requires a separate user request and the mutation rules below.\n- Do not use a \"can I\" check as a prerequisite for another Skill. The owning\n Skill or Tool remains responsible for its operation and authorization result.\n\n## Core Instructions\n\n### Current-User Capability Questions\n\n- Use `cognitivedb_user_current_get` for the authenticated user's own profile;\n it needs no Space context and supplies identity, not roles or capabilities.\n- For the user's role in a selected Space, use `cognitivedb_space_members_list`\n to match the authenticated identity to one exact member record. Use\n `cognitivedb_space_roles_list` when the role's permission definition is needed.\n If the lookup is denied or no exact match is established, report the role as\n undetermined rather than inferring it from the profile or another member.\n- For a current-user capability question, call a preflight only when the live\n contract defines one. If no reliable preflight exists, report that access\n cannot be determined before execution; never execute a mutation merely to\n test access or reconstruct authorization from roles, grants, or ownership.\n- Never determine SQL DDL or DML authorization from asset capabilities such as\n `edit_remote` unless the live SQL Tool contract defines that evidence as its\n pre-execution gate. Without such a gate, classify the authorization question\n as undetermined before execution.\n- Distinguish `allowed`, `denied`, and `cannot be determined before execution`.\n If the requested Tool is unavailable, report the capability as unavailable\n in this session rather than as a verified denial. A capability answer does\n not authorize or execute the requested action.\n- Explain required access or who can grant it only from the live contract or\n structured evidence. Do not expose raw permission codes unless the user asks\n for MCP or API diagnostics.\n\n### Access Inspection\n\n- For member, grant, effective-access, or audit inspection, use the narrowest read\n for the requested subject and scope. Request a Catalog or Schema only when\n the action is target-specific. Report partial evidence as partial; do not\n assemble a verdict from unrelated roles. An inspection request does not authorize changes.\n- Catalog grant inspection requires an exact Catalog; never present one Catalog's\n grants as an Organization-wide inventory. Ask once if the requested scope is missing.\n- Use metadata search only to find assets by keyword. To browse the Catalog\n hierarchy, use the Catalog and Schema list tools; do not treat search results\n as a complete tree.\n- Scope audit reads to one exact resolved data asset and the smallest useful\n time range and filters. Treat actor names and event details as sensitive evidence.\n- Scope validation failures and denials to the returned subject, action, and Space;\n an ineligible recipient or denied asset read does not imply no platform access.\n\n### Access Mutations\n\n- Before a mutation, bind the current Space and actor. Use a permission preflight\n when the live contract provides one; otherwise let the requested operation\n enforce authorization. Stop on denial, ambiguity, stale context, or cross-Space\n evidence; confirmation is not authorization.\n- Resolve targets from live results: invitation by email, member by username,\n data assets through their exact returned hierarchy, and revocation by direct\n `grantId`. Use `ALL_GRANTS` only for an explicitly confirmed complete removal.\n- Confirm the exact target, scope, effect, and rollback before each mutation.\n Space membership changes do not change Organization roles or data-asset grants.\n- Never assign `O-Owner` or built-in Space `Owner`. Grant or revoke Catalog,\n Schema, and Table privileges only with verified authority from the\n target-specific capability result. Include\n automatically added `USE_CATALOG` or `USE_SCHEMA` in the stated impact.\n- Create custom roles only with live returned permission codes and unique names.\n Never delete a built-in role; state visible membership impact before deleting\n a custom role.\n- Execute a confirmed mutation once, then read the exact affected object to\n verify it. After an uncertain result, read that object before any retry.\n- For a user-corrected validation input, retain the action and unchanged context;\n resolve the corrected target once, recheck permission, and confirm the changed\n mutation. Never reuse old-target approval. For an uncertain prior outcome, first\n inspect the old target and stop if its outcome remains unknown.\n\n## Allowed MCP Tools\n\n- `cognitivedb_audit_logs_list`\n- `cognitivedb_catalog_list`\n- `cognitivedb_catalog_metadata_search`\n- `cognitivedb_catalog_permissions_get`\n- `cognitivedb_catalog_permissions_grant`\n- `cognitivedb_catalog_permissions_list`\n- `cognitivedb_catalog_permissions_revoke`\n- `cognitivedb_catalog_schemas`\n- `cognitivedb_owner_transfer`\n- `cognitivedb_schema_permissions_get`\n- `cognitivedb_schema_permissions_grant`\n- `cognitivedb_schema_permissions_revoke`\n- `cognitivedb_space_current_get`\n- `cognitivedb_space_custom_role_create`\n- `cognitivedb_space_custom_role_delete`\n- `cognitivedb_space_member_invite_cancel`\n- `cognitivedb_space_member_invite_resend`\n- `cognitivedb_space_member_remove`\n- `cognitivedb_space_member_role_set`\n- `cognitivedb_space_members_invite`\n- `cognitivedb_space_members_list`\n- `cognitivedb_space_roles_list`\n- `cognitivedb_table_permissions_get`\n- `cognitivedb_table_permissions_grant`\n- `cognitivedb_table_permissions_list`\n- `cognitivedb_table_permissions_revoke`\n- `cognitivedb_user_current_get`\n"
}SHA-256 of public snapshot: 212a7eaeb74a4d84433736b784f2a263de75b0c451204b76f6538683a766c801