← Codex Process JobsCONTENT HISTORYWHAT CHANGED · RULE-BASED ANALYSIS
Update to Codex Process Jobs
Snapshot Sep 30, 2026 · 23:13 UTC · version 0.5.0
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{
"description": "Safely request termination of a tracked detached process group using PID identity validation and a SIGTERM-to-SIGKILL grace period. Use only when the user asks to stop a job; critical repair, migration, firmware, or destructive jobs require explicit risk-aware approval and --force.",
"included_files": [
{
"relative_path": "agents/openai.yaml",
"size_in_bytes": 182
}
],
"name": "cancel",
"skill_md_contents": "---\nname: cancel\ndescription: Safely request termination of a tracked detached process group using PID identity validation and a SIGTERM-to-SIGKILL grace period. Use only when the user asks to stop a job; critical repair, migration, firmware, or destructive jobs require explicit risk-aware approval and --force.\n---\n\n# Cancel Process Job\n\nResolve `<plugin-root>` as two directories above this `SKILL.md` and run:\n\n```text\nnode \"<plugin-root>/scripts/job.mjs\" cancel <job-id> [--force] --json\n```\n\nNever search memory for CPJ work; use validated CPJ state.\n\nIf `${CODEX_HOME:-$HOME/.codex}/process-jobs` is not writable in the current\nsandbox, request narrow controller escalation on the first call; do not probe\nfor a predictable `EPERM`.\n\nNever cancel because a Codex task, client, or terminal is closing. Require a\nspecific job id; use `$status <job-id>` first only if identity/state is unclear.\nA direct request authorizes normal cancellation of a non-critical job.\n\nFor a `CRITICAL` job, explain that interruption can worsen partial state and\nobtain explicit approval immediately before `--force`. This bypasses only the\ncritical guard: the controller still validates PID identity, sends SIGTERM to\nthe process group, waits up to five seconds, and uses SIGKILL only if needed.\nNever bypass an identity refusal with untracked `kill` without separate\nauthorization after inspection.\n\nFilesystem/device repair can leave metadata partially rewritten. Prefer waiting\nunless continued execution presents a greater concrete risk.\n"
}SHA-256 of public snapshot: 102d33acc57720205b678dff4500098a8e2e0e3d889648c46501e015d7732d39