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skills/authorized-security-review/references/investigation.md
3.08 KB · Sep 30, 2026 · 23:17 UTC
# Investigation and validation ## Map the system Identify real entry points and protected resources. For each relevant surface, record who can reach it, what inputs they control, which identity/tenant/object boundaries apply, and which control should enforce the intended restriction. In source review, follow actual callers, transformations, validators, and sensitive operations. In black-box review, distinguish observed behavior from inferred implementation. Use forward tracing from input and backward tracing from sensitive operations. Examine related routes or operations when they share a suspicious control, while staying within scope. Suitable questions include whether object ownership is enforced, role transitions preserve restrictions, a parser changes interpretation, or an input reaches an unintended destination. Select questions from the target's evidence, not a mandatory exhaustive vulnerability checklist. ## Test a hypothesis Record expected behavior, the smallest permitted comparison that could distinguish secure from insecure behavior, and the expected evidence. Prefer a baseline/control request and a narrowly changed request using controlled accounts and data. Inspect the application effect, not merely a success status. Rule out caching, account confusion, intended public access, documented sharing, and client-only behavior. Bound execution by program constraints. Do not automatically escalate a limited result to shell access, persistence, credential collection, broad data extraction, or disruptive load. No exploit or payload catalog is bundled in this workflow; select a permitted validation technique based on the specific hypothesis and current authorization. ## Candidate record - Stable local finding ID and concise title - Asset, endpoint or source path, revision when known, and timestamp - Attacker role, preconditions, and controlled input/action - Expected security invariant and actual failed control - Trace from entry point through relevant transformations to the effect - Evidence locations, source line numbers or request/response references - Baseline comparison, mitigations, and strongest counterevidence - Observed impact versus unproven possible extensions - Validation method, confidence, severity rationale, and proof gaps - Status: confirmed / plausible / rejected / deferred - Suggested remediation and a regression-check idea Use the program's severity convention where provided. Base severity on demonstrated impact, prerequisites, reachable privilege boundaries, and realistic likelihood. Do not manufacture a CVSS vector or label unknown deployment assumptions as proven. Missing runtime reproduction does not invalidate a complete source-backed dataflow; it does limit claims about deployment. Deduplicate by the broken control and effective fix, preserving distinct affected operations and evidence. Do not merge findings merely because they share a CWE. Maintain honest coverage: actually reviewed/tested surfaces, excluded surfaces, deferred work, and unresolved questions. Avoid claiming exhaustive assurance or guaranteed bounty eligibility.
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